IIIT Conference on Orphan Care from Islamic Perspective:

Adoption, Kafala, Foster Care & Beyond

Herndon, VA – April 13, 2017

In our times, there is an undeniable crisis in many parts of the Muslim world. There are wars, revolutions, and insurgencies, impacting millions of children and making them parentless and homeless. I am honored to take part in this conference organized by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), in response to this crisis, with the objective of finding Sharia-compliant solutions to alleviate the suffering of those children by affording them compassionate surrogate families who will foster their healthy development. I will be mainly addressing the issues that pertain to nasab (lineage) and raḍâ‘ah (breastfeeding).

Islam places a great deal of importance in the care of children. In fact, the jurists have listed the preservation of progeny as one of the primary objectives of the Sharia. The Sharia, therefore, is keen to confirm the filiality of every newborn, and it allots several admissible proofs for that. As for orphans who were deprived of one or both of their parents, Islam has made the obligation of caring for them binding on the Muslim community collectively. It has promised a great reward for those who provide physical care for them and treat them with compassion. However, the prohibition of tabanni (translated as ‘adoption’) seems to have resulted, in our times, in many Muslim families hesitating to take in orphans and raise them as their own children, mainly due to matters related to mingling between them and their own children when they grow to maturity. Also, the uncertainty about the permissibility of going through the legal process of adoption bars many Muslim families from being able to bring orphans into their households.

I will try to shed some light on the issue of lineage and its establishment in Islam and the differences between tabanni which involves the concealment of nasab, and which was unanimously prohibited by the scholars, and some current forms of legal adoption in non-Muslim-majority countries like the United States. I will also address the extension of the bond of kinship through breastfeeding: while it does not only apply to orphans, I will show how it serves a great purpose for them in particular. The goal of this paper is to explore ways to facilitate caring for orphans by conservative Muslim families.

Nasab

Linguistically, nasab (lineage) has several meanings. The various meanings all share its common root, which is the relationship between one thing and another, as stated by Ibn Fâris.  Perhaps the meaning most relevant to us is ‘filial bond.’

            As for the technical definition, the jurists did not busy themselves with it as its meaning was clear, and sufficed with mentioning its causes. Some contemporaries have defined it as:

A state of legal affiliation between one individual and another, whereby the individual was born from the womb of a legally married woman, as a result of a legitimate contract, or what was thought to be a legitimate contract, with the one whose sperm was responsible for the pregnancy. 

This definition precludes the possibility of establishing paternity for one involved in an illegitimate relationship. We address the controversy regarding this below.

The Causes of Establishment of Filiality

These are mostly agreed upon between the jurists, namely:

The [marital] bed (firâsh), which refers to the right of the husband of the woman giving birth to the paternity of the born child. The jurists considered marriage itself equivalent to copulation because the marital relationship is based on privacy. Thus, they agree that a legitimate marriage contract proves filiality for whoever is born during this marriage, and they only differed on the condition of known consummation or its possibility.  Also falling under the same status as “the marital bed” is copulation with someone mistakenly assumed to be lawful to him.

Clear proof (bayyinah), denotes the testimony of two men, or a man and two women, that So-and-so is the son/daughter of So-and-so. For maternity, the testimony of one woman is accepted by most scholars.

Admission and claiming paternity (iqrâr and istilḥâq), and these refer to the father’s acknowledgment of paternity, or the heirs – or some of them – testifying that the person is their stepbrother/stepsister from their father. Most jurists permit attributing the child that has no known ancestry to the one who claims him, without investigating the claimant, contingent upon this being logically possible. They do not stipulate that the claimant must have been previously married, but stipulate that he not explicitly admit fornicating.  Of note here is that the scholars maintain that all children claimed by Muslim converts before their conversion continue to be attributed to them. This was the judgment of Omar.  The jurists also argued that thousands of people accepted Islam in front of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) and he never enquired about the filiality of their children, even though a substantial proportion of their marriages were invalid. Having said that about admission, it would be incorrect to believe that this may be used as a ḥeelah (legal device) to circumvent the Islamic prohibition of tabanni, as we discuss below.

Common knowledge (al-istifâḍah), which denotes that this fact, of So-and-so being the son/daughter of So-and-so, is known to all people around them. 

Islam’s Keenness to Ascertain Ancestry for All Children 

Islam places great importance on ascertaining ancestry for every child whenever possible, and that is because it considers ancestry one of the rights belonging to children. Due to this, Islam has more of a propensity to confirm a lineage than to deny it. Ibrâheem ibn Mufliḥ wrote: “Because with ancestry, precaution is taken by confirming it, not denying it.”  Later, he stated: “Asserting ancestry is based on that which is most probable, and is asserted by the mere possibility, even if the copulation itself has not been proven. However, it is not denied by the mere possibility of denial.”

Islam Wants to Assert the Actual Ancestry

While Islam is keen to establish an ancestry for each child, it wants to assert the actual ancestry, and thus the Most High says: “Call them by [the names of] their fathers; it is more just in the sight of Allah.” [al-Aḥzâb 33:5]

Despite the flexibility shown by the scholars in the cases of admission and claiming paternity (iqrâr and istilḥâq), they are in agreement that a man may not claim the paternity of a child who is not his.  Not only this, in fact, it is legislated for the husband to deny paternity of a child whom he strongly suspects is not from him. Ibn Qudâmah stated: “Qadhf (accusing of fornication) has three types; of them is the obligatory. This is when he sees his wife fornicating during a non-menstrual period wherein he did not copulate with her… This is because it is essentially certain that this child is from the fornicator, and not denying [paternity of] him will lead to this child being ascribed to him. In turn, [the child] would inherit from him and from his relatives, and they will inherit from him, and he [the child] will see his [the husband’s] daughters and sisters [without hijab], and none of that is permissible.” 

Claiming Paternity of One’s Biological Child from an Illegitimate Relationship 

While this issue may not be directly related to the care of orphans, it has the potential of decreasing their numbers. It appears that the denial of the right to paternity for the fornicator is not without exception, for the evidence for this was the statement of the Messenger (pbuh): “The child is for the [marital] bed, and the stone is for the adulterer.”  Understanding the circumstances of the incident wherein his statement was made is essential for identifying his (pbuh) intent.

On the authority of ‘Â’ishah (may Allah be pleased with her), who said: “‘Utbah ibn Abi Waqqâṣ had willed that his brother, Sa‘d, take custody of the child born to Zam‘ah’s concubine; ‘Utbah said: ‘He is my son.’ When the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) arrived, and ‘Abd ibn Zam‘ah came with him, Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqâṣ said: ‘This is my brother’s son; he assured me that this is his son.’ ‘Abd ibn Zam‘ah said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, this is my brother, the son of Zam‘ah; he was born upon his bed (to his legitimate partner).’ The Messenger of Allah (pbuh) looked at the child born to Zam‘ah’s concubine, and found him more resembling of ‘Utbah ibn Abi Waqqâṣ than anyone. Thus, he (pbuh) said: ‘Veil yourself from him, O Sawdah,’ due to the resemblance of ‘Utbah ibn Abi Waqqâṣ that he noticed. He (pbuh) also said: ‘The child is for the [marital] bed, and the stone is for the adulterer.’”

It is obvious that the hadith describes a specific incident wherein two are disputing over the paternity of a child; one being the legitimate partner and the other being the fornicator. There was no proof aside from the firâsh (legitimate union) and the qareenah of resemblance, so the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) closed the door to prevent this grave evil from spreading. Otherwise, fornicators and scandal-mongers would become emboldened to claim being the fathers of children born to women who have husbands.

However, if a woman does not have a husband, then what is closer to the Sunnah is attributing the child to the fornicator, and this is the view of some Mâlikis, al-Ḥasan, Ibn Seereen, an-Nakha‘i, Is-ḥâq, and Sulaymân ibn Yasâr, and the preference of Ibn Taymiyyah. Additionally, this is the opinion of the Ḥanafis, on the condition that he marries her before the child is born.

In support of this view are several evidences: of them, the hadith of ‘Ali (rA), in which three individuals came to ‘Ali from Yemen disputing over a child, and the three had copulated with the same woman during a single non-menstrual period. He said: “You are adamant disputants, so I will cast lots between you. Whoever wins, the child belongs to him, and he must pay two-thirds of the blood money to his two companions.” He cast between them, and allotted the child to the winner, which made the Prophet (pbuh), laugh until his molar teeth were visible. Notice that he did not ask them if they all copulated with her mistakenly, as that would be an extremely unlikely possibility.

Also, when Hilâl ibn Umayyah accused his wife, in front of the Prophet (pbuh), of committing adultery with Shareek ibn Saḥmâ’, he (pbuh) said: “Watch her; if she brings him forth with dark eyes, wide buttocks, and full legs, then he belongs to Shareek ibn Saḥmâ’.” Later, the wife gave birth to a child of that description, so the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Were it not for what preceded from the Book of Allah, there would have been a [different] matter between her and me.”  The point of reference is the Prophet (pbuh) attributing the child to Shareek based on resemblance, though the woman was married, while the husband denied the child. Thus, that denial alongside the resemblance was satisfactory to accept that the child had been fathered by Shareek.

Most jurists permit attributing a child whose ancestry is unknown to the one who claims him, without investigating the claimant, contingent upon the claim being logically possible.  They do not stipulate that the claimant must not have been previously married, but do stipulate that he not explicitly admit to fornicating.

From these evidences and others, it appears that the child born of fornication is attributed to its father if its mother was unmarried. Understanding the evidences collectively points strongly to this, and preserving the rights of these children is better facilitated by holding their biological fathers responsible for their care.

Legal Adoption and the Rules of Nasab in Islam

The discussion of the permissibility or impermissibility of legal adoption and how the issue of nasab in Islam relates to it depends on the clear understanding of the concept of tabanni in contrast to the different types of legal adoption in our times.

The previously quoted statement of Ibn Qudâmah, “… and not denying [paternity of] him will lead to this child being ascribed to him. In turn, [the child] would inherit from him and from his relatives, and they will inherit from him, and [the child] will see his [the husband’s] daughters and sisters [without hijab], and none of that is permissible,”  indicates that the prohibition of tabanni was not primarily about a child having the name of the family who decided to look after him or her and consider that child as though he or she were part of that family. It was mainly about the concealment of the original nasab and the creation of a fictitious new one, resulting in many practical consequences. These include the prohibition of marriage and the subsequent permissibility of free mingling between the genders without observing ḥijâb, as well as the financial obligations towards the kin and the right to inheritance. The prohibition of tabanni in Islam was to protect the institution of the family and its structure, to keep lineages from becoming obscured, and to maintain the greatest level of transparency  in this regard. It also protects the rights of the biological parents. One may claim that the trend of open adoptions in our times is a recognition of these reasons. Additionally, this prohibition is a mere recognition of the reality that biological children are different from adopted ones.  It was to prevent all the trauma that results from failed adoptions, which cause many families to petition the courts to rescind their adoption. The rates may be in some places as high as 50 percent in unfinalized adoptions. 

Having said all that about the wisdom of prohibiting tabanni, we must agree that this prohibition was never meant to impede people from caring for orphans, and we should ensure that it does not. The reward for caring for orphans in Islam is beyond any need for elaboration. It is a communal obligation to ensure that homeless (laqeeṭ: foundling) and parentless (yateem) children are protected and cared for. In many Muslim-majority countries, the system of kafâlah (orphan custody) is already existent and should be improved. It is basically a voluntary commitment to providing care for a child just as a parent would. This would be the ideal system from an Islamic viewpoint, and it ought to be promoted and enhanced to provide the greatest stability for the relationship between the child and the foster family. In some non-Muslim-majority countries, for example in the United States, there are two options for the care of children: foster care and adoption. The first is less stable than kafâlah, whereas the second is meant to be more stable, but it creates a fictitious legal relationship and makes it binding on all parties involved. There are two models of adoption though: open and closed, with the closed type leading to concealment of the origin of the child and his or her biological lineage and severing all ties with the birth parents and heritage.

While the improved system of kafâlah is the ideal choice for parents wanting to care for orphans, in the United States and some other non-Muslim-majority countries, this system does not exist, and Muslims are left with foster care, which is less stable, or adoption, which could be closed or open. This reality makes legal adoption the only way a family could raise orphans like their own children. We should now examine the permissibility of legal adoption in the United States and similar countries from the perspective of necessity. If the preservation of the religion is at the top of the five objectives of Shari’a, then it is clear that those many Muslim children who come to the US as refugees, and those who lose their Muslim families for some reason or another need surrogate Muslim families to step forward and assume the responsibility of adopting them to protect them and protect their religion. And while legal adoption in the United States is still more like the forbidden tabanni than the commendable kafâlah, it is not completely like the tabanni that was known during the time of the Prophet, and many of the problems related to legal adoption can be mitigated. The principles of ḍaroorah (necessity) would make it permissible; we should then look for ways to mitigate some of the conflicts between the Islamic rulings and the practical consequences of adoption within the existing legal framework we have here in the United States. 

Legal adoption, particularly open adoption, does not force the adoptive family to conceal the actual ancestry of the child, or to lie to him or her about it. In most places, it would not require the adoptive parents to pass on their inheritance to that child (see the discussion on bequests below), and would certainly not force the non-observance of ḥijâb in front of the child after they become adults. The major practical consequences of legal adoption that may be in conflict with Islamic teachings are:

Making the voluntary commitment in kafâlah a binding one. Although it is detested to assume an obligation that one may resent in the future or find hardship in committing to, the virtue and reward of caring for orphans may not be forsaken for this, and the higher objectives of kafâlah should not be frustrated by this required commitment.

Prohibiting marriage between the adopted child and members of the adoptive family that are not considered their maḥram in Islam. However, legal adoption does not impose uncovering or improper mingling. It only restricts something permitted (mubâḥ), but does not impose something prohibited (ḥarâm). The adoptive family may give up that mubâḥ for the greater good of caring for an orphan. In the rare case where some of the biological and adoptive children may have an ardent desire to get married, rescinding the adoption through the court may be sought.

Some states give the adopted child the family’s last name. Provided that the child would not be misinformed of his or her ancestry, and that the rights of the biological parents will not be undermined in case they demand them, if the laws in a particular state require giving the child one’s last name, this should be acceptable for the greater good of being able to raise this child and afford him or her a compassionate environment in which to grow up.

The Relief of Shar‘i Constraints

The main constraints that may deter families from adoption are in the areas of the financial rights of the adoptees and inter-mingling between the sexes.

As for committing to a voluntary charity and the fear that one may be overwhelmed by this commitment, considering the expenses of the ‘adoptee’ to be part of one’s zakat may offset some of the burden.

As for the inheritance, bequeathing up to one third of one’s estate to the adoptee(s) is permissible and commendable. With the approval of the mandatorily legal heirs, a testator may bequeath an even greater proportion to them.

Finally, the concern about mingling is one that is of great importance for conservative Muslim families. This is more of a concern today than in the past because of urbanization and modern-day living conditions which are so different from those of earlier Muslim communities. In the following section, I will discuss how the extension of the bond of kinship through breastfeeding may be of great value in this regard.

Raḍâ‘ah

The extension of the bond of kinship through breastfeeding is of great value and wisdom. While it does not only apply to orphans, it serves a great purpose for them in particular. If an infant lost his mother, another woman could nurse him, and he will be a member of her family forever. This will allow him (if he is a male) to mingle with her daughters as his sisters and with her sisters as his aunts. If she nursed a girl, that girl will be a daughter to the ‘milk-mother’s’ husband and a sister to her sons. However, the filiality that results from breastfeeding is consequential only in the interactions between the genders and the prohibition of marriage, not in the sphere of financial obligations or inheritance.

Before I begin the discussion of the legality of this matter, it may be important to start by asserting its plausibility for women who did not give birth. According to a study published by The Journal of the American Board of Family Medicine, breastfeeding the adopted child is recommended and possible for women who did not give birth.  Other studies have also shown that the benefit of the mother–child bonding that happens as a result of nursing was more important than milk production as a means of nutrition. 

Filiality through breastfeeding is proven in the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and by ijmâ‘ (scholarly consensus). Allah mentioned the following among the prohibited-to-marry women (this interpretation of the meaning): “… your foster mothers who nursed you, your sisters through nursing…” [al-Nisâ’ 4:23] Ibn ‘Abbâs reported that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Breastfeeding results in the same restrictions caused by consanguinity.” 

So, once a woman breastfeeds a child, he becomes a son to her and to the man whose sperm caused the pregnancy that resulted in the production of the milk.  This will make the restrictions of marriage for that boy like those if he were their biological son. If the woman breastfeeds a female infant, she also becomes a daughter to them both with all the restrictions of marriage applying to her as if she were their biological daughter. As the hadith of Ibn ‘Abbâs indicates, the restrictions (of marriage) and the bond of relationship that result from breastfeeding are the same like those that result from consanguinity by consensus. Additionally, breastfeeding results in all the restrictions that result from marriage (muṣâharah), according to the vast majority. Therefore, it will be forbidden for the man to marry his wife’s wet-nurse, or any of her ‘milk-daughters’ whom she nursed with milk caused by pregnancy from another man.

If a woman received hormonal stimulants which resulted in the production of milk without pregnancy or childbirth, or had one of her kin who is breastfeeding nurse the orphan she desires to take in, the husband will not be a ‘milk-father’ in either case, but he will be in the first case a ‘milk step-father,’ and in the second case, he may or may not become a maḥram, based on the relationship of the wet-nurse to his wife.

The Age of the Breastfeeding Child and Legally Prohibitive Breastfeeding

Before delving into the controversy over breastfeeding those older than two years, it is vital to note that, according to the majority of scholars, the legally prohibitive breastfeeding is whatever milk enters the throat, whether by suckling or through drenching (pouring milk into the throat) or nasal feeding (which is more controversial), and whether it was pure or mixed, as long as it is not completely absorbed into the other substance.  The actual suckling is not required according to the vast majority, for the Prophet (pbuh) said, “Breastfeeding is not legally consequential except what produces the growth of flesh and bones.”  Feeding through those other routes does that just like suckling.

The Controversy over Breastfeeding the Older Orphan “Al-Kabeer”

According to the majority, including the four madhâhib, the legally prohibitive nursing is that which takes place within the first two years.

Allah said, “Mothers may breastfeed their children for two whole years, (that is) for those (parents) who desire to complete the nursing period…” [al-Baqarah 2:233].

The Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said: “Breastfeeding is not legally consequential except if it expands the stomach and happens before the age of weaning.”

In addition to the verse and the hadith mentioned above, there are multiple other reports indicating that the legally consequential breastfeeding is only that which takes place in the child’s first two years of life. Ibn Qudâmah wrote, “One of the conditions of breastfeeding creating the relationship of maḥram is that it should be within the first two years. This is the opinion of most of the scholars. Something like this was narrated from Omar, ‘Ali, Ibn Omar, Ibn Mas‘ood, Ibn ‘Abbâs, Abu Hurayrah and the wives of the Prophet (pbuh), apart from ‘Â’ishah. It was also the opinion of al-Shi‘bi, Ibn Shubrumah, al-Oozâ’i, al-Shâfi’i, Is-hâq, Abu Yoosuf, Muhammad, and Abu Thawr, and was narrated in one report from Mâlik.”

It is clear that breastfeeding an infant or a child under the age of two will result in him being part of the ‘milk-family’ by consensus. However, some of the orphans who need homes and families may be past the age cutoff, which is two years according to the vast majority, with some slight variations (Abu Ḥaneefah: 30 months; Mâlik: 26 months). To the vast majority, those orphans may not be breastfed to establish maḥramiyyah (legal prohibition). There is, however, an authentic hadith reported by Muslim that the Prophet (pbuh) said to the wife of Abu Ḥudhayfah concerning Sâlim, the freed slave of Abu Ḥudhayfah: “Breastfeed him, then you will become his maḥram.”  This happened after the prohibition of adoption. Sâlim was their adoptee, and had nowhere else to go, and he was a young adult, so the Prophet (pbuh) allowed her to do that for this special condition. Some of the scholars considered the breastfeeding of one older than two prohibitive, and that is the position of Abdullah ibn az-Zubayr, ‘Urwah, Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim, ‘Aṭâ’, and was most defended by Imam Ibn Ḥâzm.  Before that, it was adopted by ‘Â’ishah – may Allah be pleased with her. However, Umm Salamah and all other wives of the Prophet (pbuh) (except Ḥafsah, as reported by aṭ-Ṭabari) refused that position and told ‘Â’ishah, “By Allah, we do not know whether that was a special concession granted by the Prophet (pbuh) to Sâlim, exclusive (to him) of the people.”  The majority followed the reasoning of Umm Salamah and the other wives of the Prophet (pbuh) and considered this ruling to be exclusive for Sâlim or abrogated by the specification of the two year term. Imams Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim took a middle position. They considered it prohibitive only when there is a need similar to that of Abu-Hudhayfah’s family.  Although this position is a minority one, it has some validity, and it may also ease the suffering of many Muslim children by facilitating their foster caring by surrogate Muslim families. This is not regarded as a trick or pretense, rather it is a legitimate shar‘i concession. And while it is commendable for Muslims to be wary of positions that are in conflict with the agreement of the four imams, this aversion should not completely rule out the possibility that the truth may be outside of their agreement, but merely serve as a warning for mujtahideen to proceed with caution and for non-mujtahideen to stop. Even if we consider an opinion weak, it may sometimes be adopted to relieve some hardship, given that it meets some conditions as described by the author of Marâqi as-Su‘ood in the following verses:

وكَوْنِهِ يُلْــجى إليهِ الضَّرَرُ — إنْ كانَ لَمْ يَشْتَــدّ فِيهِ الخَوَرُ

وثَبَتَ العَــزْوُ وقَـدْ تَحَقَّقَا — ضُرّاً مَن الضُّرُّ بِهِ تَعَلَّــــقَا

Finally, because the pressing need or necessity may compel people to act upon such [weak positions] if they are not too weak,

and their attribution [to a mujtahid] was established, and the one under duress is certain of their necessity.

This is a matter of ḥâjah ‘âmmah (communal need), and that takes precedence over the individual’s needs and comes close in certain cases to the rulings of ḍaroorah (necessity). If a certain child may lose his faith if a Muslim family does not adopt him or her, the ḍaroorah is obvious. It is for the verifying scholars, along with the experts, to make this judgment concerning the communal necessities and needs.

Conclusion

Muslims in Muslim-majority countries should enhance the kafâlah system to attain all of the benefits of legal adoption, while complying with the spirit and letter of the Sharia in this regard. Wherever a kafâlah system is not available, Muslims may legally adopt children, to fulfill the obvious necessity, with the following guidelines:

Maintaining transparency and affording the children the right to know their lineage, ethnic and national origins. This can be done with open adoption.

Keeping the family names of the children whenever legally possible. When not, the children may be given the last name of the adoptive family. 

Maintaining all of the shar‘i constraints, such as the rules of mingling and inheritance, to the best of the involved parties’ capacity, while showing flexibility in relieving these constraints whenever possible with concessions and valid legal devices that are not in conflict with the objectives of al-Shâriʽ (Exalted is He).

Bibliography

1. The books of Sunnah (hadith collections) are not included in this bibliography due to the ease of tracing the reports to them.
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4. In it, Muhammad ibn ‘Arfah ad-Dusooqi al-Miṣri (d. 1230 AH) explained al-Sharḥ al-Kabeer which was written by ad-Dardeer (d. 1201 AH) and wherein he explained Mukhtaṣar al-Khaleel; a reliable Mâliki texts written by the esteemed scholar, Abu Muhammad Ḍiyâ’ ad-Deen Khaleel ibn Is-ḥâq (d. 776 AH).
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18. In it, Mukhtaṣar al-Khaleel is explained; a reliable Mâliki text written by the esteemed scholar, Abu Muhammad Ḍiyâ’ ad-Deen Khaleel ibn Is-ḥâq ibn Moosâ ibn Shu‘ayb (d. 776 AH).
19. al-Margheenâni, Abul Ḥasan ‘Ali ibn Abi Bakr ibn ‘Abdil-Jaleel ar-Rashadâni. Al-Hidâyah Sharḥ Bidâyat al-Mubtadi’. Cairo: Al-Maktabah al-Islâmiyyah.
20. In it, the esteemed imam, al-Margheenâni (d. 593 AH), explains the text Bidâyat al-Mubtadi’, a reliable Ḥanafi text which collects the edicts of al-Qudoori and Al-Jâmi‘ as-Sagheer of Muhammad ibn al-Ḥasan.
21. al-Nawawi, Abu Zakariyâ Yaḥyâ Ibn Sharaf (d. 676 AH/1277 CE). Al-‎Majmoo‘. Al-Muneeriyah edition.
22. al-Sabeel, ‘Umar ibn Muhammad. Al-Basmah al-Wirâthiyyah wa Madâ Mashroo‘iyyat Istikhdâmihâ fil-Nasab wal-Jinâyah. Retrieved from Al-Mawsoo‘ah al-Shâmilah, www.islamport.com.